Key Supreme Court of Ohio Cases
of Interest to Juvenile Defense Lawyers
Last Updated:
January 24, 2013
Recently Decided /
Other Decisions
Recently Decided
State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, ____
Ohio St.3d ____,
2012-Ohio-5697
Date of Decision: December 6, 2012
Docket:
2011-0934
Summary: A juvenile court patently and unambiguously
lacks jurisdiction to classify a juvenile as a juvenile sex offender registrant
after the court's delinquency disposition has been fully satisfied or the
juvenile turns 21 years old, because the juvenile is no longer a "child" under the
applicable statute.
In re J.B., ____ Ohio St.3d ____,
2012-Ohio-5675
Date of Decision: December 6, 2012
Docket:
2012-0018
Summary: Cause remanded to the Tenth District
Court of Appeals for application of State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch,
____ Ohio St.3d ____,
2012-Ohio-5697.
In re Bruce S., ____ Ohio St.3d ____,
2012-Ohio-5696
Date of Decision: December 6, 2012
Oral Argument:
August 22, 2012
Docket:
2012-0059
Summary:
Senate Bill 10's classification, registration, and
community-notification provisions cannot be constitutionally applied to a sex
offender who committed his sex offense between July 1, 2007, and December 31,
2007, the last day before January 1, 2008, the effective date of S.B. 10's
classification, registration, and community-notification provisions.
In re R.A., ____ Ohio St.3d ____,
2012-Ohio-5500
Date of Decision: December 5, 2012
Docket:
2011-1182
Summary:
Affirmed on the authority of In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d
309,
2012-Ohio-4538.
In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1,
2012-Ohio-4961
Date of Decision: October 30, 2012
Oral Argument:
December 6, 2011
Docket:
2011-0107
Summary:
In an SYO proceeding, the invocation of an adult prison sentence
upon a juvenile, pursuant to
R.C. 2152.14, is
constitutional and does not implicate a juvenile's right to a jury trial or the
beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard; the standard is clear and convincing
evidence. However, juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction over adjudicated
delinquents once they are 21 years old.
State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434,
2012-Ohio-4544
Date of Decision: October 4, 2012
Oral Argument:
June
5, 2012
Docket:
2011-1677
Syllabus of the Court:
An amenability hearing under
R.C. 2152.12(B)(3)
may be waived provided (1) the juvenile, through counsel, expressly states on
the record a waiver of the amenability hearing and (2) the juvenile court
engages in a colloquy on the record with the juvenile to determine that the
waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309,
2012-Ohio-4538
Date of Decision: October 3, 2012
Oral Argument:
December 6, 2011
Docket:
2011-0215
Syllabus of the Court: The term “proceedings” as used in
R.C. 2151.352
means court proceedings, and in that context, a child is statutorily entitled to
representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court
or upon initial appearance in the juvenile court.
In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513,
2012-Ohio-1446
Date of Decision: April 3, 2012
Oral Argument:
February 16, 2011
Docket:
2010-0731
Syllabus of the Court:
To the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification
requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system,
R.C. 2152.86
violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution,
Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution,
Article I, Section 16.
In re D.J.S.,
130
Ohio St.3d 257,
2011-Ohio-5342
Date of Decision: October 20, 2011
Oral Argument:
November 4, 2009
Docket:
2008-1624
Holding: The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for application of State v. Williams, 129 Ohio
St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374.
Note: Issuance of the mandate in this case is stayed pending he
decision in In re J.V.,
2011-0107.
In re Cases Held for the Decision in In re
D.J.S., 130 Ohio St.3d 253,
2011-Ohio-5349
Date of Decision: October 20, 2011
Oral Argument:
Various Dates
Docket:
Various Docket Numbers; Opinion at
2011-Ohio-5349.
Holdings: The judgments of the courts of appeals are hereby
reversed and the causes remanded to the trial court for application of State
v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
In re A.R.,
130
Ohio St.3d 258,
2011-Ohio-5344
Date of Decision: October 20, 2011
Oral Argument:
November 4, 2009
Docket:
2009-0189
Holding: The cause is remanded to the court of appeals for application of
State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
Note: Issuance of the mandate in this case is stayed pending
the decision in In re J.V.,
2011-0107.
In re A.R.R., 130 Ohio St.3d 261,
2011-Ohio-5346.
Date of Decision: October 20, 2011
Oral Argument:
None
Docket:
2011-1027
Holding: The cause is remanded for application of
State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.
Note: Issuance of the mandate in this case is stayed pending
the decision in In re J.V.,
2011-0107.
Other Decisions
In re D.B., 129
Ohio St.3d 104,
2011-Ohio-2671
Date of Decision: June 8, 2011
Oral Argument:
February 15, 2011
Docket:
2010-0240
Syllabus of the Court:
R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to a child under the age of
13 who engages in sexual conduct with another child under 13.
Note: The significance of the Supreme
Court's holding is that children under the age of consent may not be charged
with violating R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b) because such a charge violates both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
In re M.P.,
124
Ohio St.3d 445,
2010-Ohio-599
Date of Decision: February 25, 2010
Oral Argument:
October 21, 2009
Docket:
2008-1562
Syllabus of the Court: An order of a juvenile court denying a
motion for a discretionary juvenile bindover in a delinquency proceeding because
the court finds that the child is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the
juvenile system is not a final order from which the state may appeal as a matter
of right.
In re S.B., 121 Ohio St.3d 279,
2009-Ohio-507
Date of Decision: February 11, 2009
Oral Argument:
October 1, 2008
Docket:
2007-1751
Holding: In this case, we are asked to decide whether a
delinquency charge filed against appellant under
R.C. 2152.02(F)
violated her right to due process. For the reasons that follow, we hold
that her right to due process was not violated, and we affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals.
In re L.A.B., 121 Ohio St.3d 112,
2009-Ohio-354
Date of Decision: February 5, 2009
Oral Argument:
September 17, 2008
Dockets:
2007-0895
/
2007-0912
Syllabus of the Court: A probation revocation hearing is an adjudicatory hearing, which is held to
determine whether a child is delinquent as defined by
R.C. 2152.02(F)(2);
therefore, both Juv.R. 29, setting forth the procedure for adjudicatory
hearings, and Juv.R. 35(B), setting forth the procedure for the revocation of
probation, are applicable to the hearing.
In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76,
2009-Ohio-318
Date of Decision: February 4, 2009
Oral Argument:
October 15, 2008
Docket:
2007-2239
Syllabus of the Court: A court may order a juvenile to serve a previously suspended commitment after
probation supervision has been terminated when the juvenile violates a separate,
unexpired condition of community control.
State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540,
2009-Ohio-9
Date of Decision: January 8, 2009
Oral Argument:
January 9, 2008
Dockets:
2007-0291/2007-0472
Syllabus of the Court:
1. R.C.
2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i), which requires a juvenile court judge to consider
certain factors before imposing a serious-youthful-offender dispositional
sentence, does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or Sections 5 and 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
2. Constitutional jury trial rights do not apply, in a pre-Foster sentencing, to
findings that a juvenile court has made under Ohio's adult felony sentencing
statutes when the juvenile court imposes the stayed adult portion of a
serious-youthful-offender dispositional sentence pursuant to
R.C. 2152.13.
In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185,
2008-Ohio-5307
Date of Decision: October 21, 2008
Oral Argument:
May 21, 2008
Docket:
2007-1451
Syllabus of the Court: The order of a juvenile court denying a
motion for mandatory bindover bars the state from prosecuting a juvenile
offender as an adult for a criminal offense. It is therefore the functional
equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment and constitutes a final order
from which the state may appeal as a matter of right.
In re Andrew, 119 Ohio St.3d 466,
2008-Ohio-4791
Date of Decision: September 25, 2008
Oral Argument:
April 8, 2008
Docket:
2007-0728
Syllabus of the Court: When a juvenile court is exercising
jurisdiction over a person adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to the matter
for which the person was adjudicated delinquent, the person adjudicated
delinquent shall be treated as a child until he reaches the age of 21.
In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267,
2007-Ohio-4919
Date of Decision: September 27, 2007
Oral Argument:
April 18, 2007
Docket:
2006-1074
Syllabus of the Court:
1. The word “represent” in the fifth sentence of
R.C. 2151.352
means to counsel or advise the juvenile in a delinquency proceeding.
2. In a delinquency proceeding, a juvenile may waive his constitutional right to
counsel, subject to certain standards, if he is counseled and advised by his
parent, custodian, or guardian. If the juvenile is not counseled by his parent,
guardian, or custodian and has not consulted with an attorney, he may not waive
his right to counsel.
3. A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is the proper test to be used in
ascertaining whether there has been a valid waiver of counsel by a juvenile.
4. In determining whether a juvenile’s waiver of counsel in a delinquency case
is valid under the totality of the circumstances, the court must consider the
age, intelligence, and education of the juvenile; the juvenile’s background and
experience generally and in the court system specifically; the presence or
absence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian; the language used by
the court in describing the juvenile’s rights; the juvenile’s conduct; the
juvenile’s emotional stability; and the complexity of the proceedings.
5. In a delinquency case, a judge, acting as parens patriae, has the inherent
authority to appoint counsel for the juvenile to determine whether he should
waive his rights.
6. In a juvenile delinquency case, the preferred practice is strict compliance
with Juv.R. 29(D). If the trial court substantially complies with Juv.R. 29(D)
in accepting an admission by a juvenile, the plea will be deemed voluntary
absent a showing of prejudice by the juvenile or a showing that the totality of
the circumstances does not support a finding of a valid waiver.
"Justice is the greatest interest of
man on earth."
Daniel Webster
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